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ABSTRACT
Sincethe average tax rate on corporate capital income is very high,
economists often conclude that taxes have caused a substantial fall in
corporate investment, a movement of capital into noncorporate uses, and
a fall in personal savings. The combined efficiency costs of these dis-
tortions are believed to be very important.
This paper attempts to show that when uncertainty and inflation are
taken into account explicitly, taxation of corporate income leaves corporate
investment incentives basically unaffected, in spite of the sizable tax
revenues collected. In addition, in some plausible situations, such
taxes can result in a gain in efficiency. The explanation for these
surprising results is that the government, by taxing capital income, ab-
sorbs a certain fraction of both the expected return and the uncertainty
in the return. While investors as a result receive a lower expected return,
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Many papers over the past twenty years have emphasized the high average tax rates on cor-
porate capital income resulting from the combination of corporate and personal income taxes a
well as property taxes. For example, Feldstein and Summers (1979) calculate that the average
combined personal and corporate income tax rate on corporate income is on the order of 66%.
Many studies have then calculated the efficiency costs of this heavy tax burden on the corporate
sector. Harberger (1962), Shoven and Whalley (1972), and Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley
(1978), in increasingly elaborate models, estimate the efficiency costs arising from the move-
ment of capital out of the corporate sector into other uses. Feldstein (1978) also emphasizes
the efficiency cost of the heavy tax burden discouraging savings and investment in general.
This paper departs from that tradition. It shows that when uncertainty and inflation are
incorporated into the model, the taxation of corporate income leaves corporate investment
incentives basically unaffected, despite the sizeable tax revenues collected. Further, in some
plausible situations, such taxes can cause a gain in efficiency. The explanation for these surpris-
ing results is that the government, by taxing capital income, absorbs a certain fraction of both
the expected return to corporate capital and the uncertainty in that return. As a result, while
investors receive a lower expected return, they also bear less risk when they invest, and these
two effects are largely offsetting.
This argument that the taxation of corporate income is nondistorting is entirely different
from that of Stiglitz (1973). Stiglitz's argument, developed in a certainty setting, relied on the
possibility of 100% debt finance for marginal investments. For much of the argument in this
paper, firms will be constrained to use only equity finance. When debt finance is allowed, the
changes in the results are minor.
The argument will first be developed intuitively in section I in a mean-variance setting. In
section II, a more general and formal version of the argument will be presented. In section III,-2-
some generalizations of the model will be explored. Section IV is the conclusion.
I. Analysis of Taxes Given Inflation and Uncertainty: An Example
Since corporate capital income is subject not only to corporate taxes but also to personal
taxes and property taxes, there is a strong presumption in the literature, e.g. Feldstein (1978),
that there is too little corporate capital, with large efficiency costs. To express this argument in
notation, let r equal the after tax rate of return required by corporate shareholders, which by
utility maximization must equal their marginal time preference rate. Also, let p equal the value
of the marginal product of capital net of depreciation. Without any tax distortions, competition
(and efficiency) requires that p =ra.
However,with a corporate tax at rate r, a property tax at rate 1, and a personal tax on
income from shares at rate e, the after tax return to corporate capital becomes only
(l—e)(l—r)(pt). Competition requires that this return equal r°. It then follows that
pt +
(l—e)(l—rY
The three taxes in this setting compound to drive the marginal product of corporate capital
sharply above the investors' marginal time preference rate. To illustrate the size of this distor-
tion, let us set r =.5,a representative average corporate tax rate during the 1970's according to
the figures in the Economic Report of the President. Also, assume that e =.16,which is approxi-
mately the personal tax rate on income to equity holders calculated by Feldstein and Summers
(1979), and assume that I =.013,a representative property tax on corporate capital according
to the figures in Fullerton-Gordon (1981).' Finally, assume that the after tax return required by
corporate investors is r° =.06,which is a representative rate of return on municipal bonds dur-
ing the 1970's. These figures together imply that the equilibrium value of p equals .156, sug-
gesting that a substantial excess burden is created by these taxes, given that the marginal time
preference rate of investors equals .06. This procedure for modelling the effects of taxes is
basically that used by Harberger (1962), Feldstein (1978), and Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley
1. The figures in Fullerton-Gordon (1981) equal half of property tax payments relative to the value of the capital
stock. This halving of the tax rate was intended to capture, however crudely, the benefits from local public services
that firms receive, which to a degree offset the tax payments they make.-3-
(1978), among others.
However, the above argument ignores the effects of inflation and uncertainty. When we
take these factors into account, the results change dramatically. Investors would now require
that the expected nominal after tax rate of return on an investment at least equal the after tax
nominal risk free interest rate, which we denote by r°, plus enough to compensate for the risk
in the return on the investment. In the context of the capital asset pricing model, the required
cov(p,rm) —
riskpremium on an investment would equal 5 = r,,, whererm is the excess rate of
var (rm)
return on the market portfolio and F,, is its expected value. The before tax nominal rate of
return on capital, with inflation, would be p + ,whereir is the inflation rate. Were there no
taxes, then in equilibrium investment would occur until
p+rr+S. (1)
How do taxes affect the equilibrium value of p? After corporate taxes and property taxes,
the rate of return would be (1—r)(p-—t) + i,sincethe inflationary capital gain is not included
in the corporate tax base. This then leaves (1—e)(1—r)(pt) + (1—c) after personal taxes,
where we assume that purely inflationary capital gains are taxed at a rate c, which presumably is
smaller than e.
In equilibrium, this after tax return ought just to equal the rate of return required by inves-
tors, given the risk. Let us assume that the excess return on the market portfolio remains
unchanged. (We will return to this assumption below.) Then the risk premium required on this
marginal investment will equal only (l—e)(l—r)S since the covariance of the after tax return
on the investment with that on the market is reduced by the factor (1—e)(1—r). Therefore,in
equilibrium, we find that
(1—e)(l—r)(pt) + (l—c)w r2a+ (l—e)(l---r)5
which implies that
—(l—c)T p=t+ +5. (2)
(1—e)(1—r)-4-
To what degree does this differ from the equilibrium without taxes, where p =— r+ ô?
For purposes of illustration, let us assume that i= .065and that r= .05,a figure slightly
lower than atoaccount for a small risk premium in the observed interest rates. Also assume
c= .05is the effective capital gains tax rate. With these figures along with the tax rate
assumptions used previously, we find that the equilibrium p is left almost exactly unchanged in
spite of the taxes. While these parameter values were chosen with a bit of care, each one is
quite representative of the values used in other papers.
While the value of p is basically unaffected by these taxes, however, considerable tax reve-
nue is still collected. According to the above formulas, total tax revenue collected per year on
this dollar investment by the corporate, property, and personal income taxes together will equal
r(p—t) + I + e(p—t)(l—r) + c.Ifwe assume that ô =.12,a number consistent with the
figures in Fullerton and Gordon (1981),2 together with the previous parameter assumptions,
then the expected tax revenues equal .070 per year. Since with these figures, the total expected
return p equals .105, the average tax rate on corporate income is .663.
How can p be left basically unaffected by a set of taxes producing an average tax rate of
.663? The simple explanation is that while investors receive much less after tax as a return on
their investment, they also require much less in return since the investment is no longer as
risky. In the example above, the fall in the risk premium required by investors just matches
the fall in the expected after tax return, leaving the equilibrium p unaffected. The government,
in taxing away part of the return, is charging the market price for the risk that it absorbs.
So far we have assumed that the investment was entirely equity financed. As Stiglitz (1973)
pointed out, the tax law treats debt-financed investment more favorably. We have also ignored
the investment tax credit and the effects of tax vs. true depreciation rates. Fullerton and Gor-
don (1981) incorporate these further complications into the model. After much effort in
measuring the needed parameters, they conclude that taxes on corporate income, rather than
merely leaving corporate investment unaffected, should cause a slight increase in corporate
2. Note that the risk premium on the marketed securities would equal (1—r)ö.-5-
investment.
Let us return now to the assumption that the excess return on the market portfolio remains
unchanged when taxes are introduced. Given that the government absorbs a sizeable fraction
of the risk as a result of the taxes on corporate income, one might have expected the market
risk premium to fall as well. However, the government cannot freely dispose of the risk that it
bears. Individuals must ultimately bear this risk, whether through random tax rates on other
income, random government expenditures, or random government deficits, so a random
inflation rate. Given that individuals must ultimately bear all the risk in the return on the
investment, with or without taxes, it is natural to assume that the risk premium on the market
portfolio remains unchanged, where the market portfolio now embodies, as it should, all the
sources of risk that the individual faces.3 The government, however, might be able to reallocate
the risk more efficiently, in which case the market risk premium ought to fall, stimulating
investment as well as increasing efficiency.
II. General Two-Period Analysis
The results in the previous section do not rely on the special assumptions underlying a
mean-variance analysis of risk. To show this, we redevelop the argument in this section using a
general two-period utility function in a setting similar to that used by Diamond (1967) and
Leland (1974). We first characterize the equilibrium amount and allocation of capital when
there are no taxes, and then investigate how the equilibrium changes when taxes are intro-
duced.
A. Equilibrium Without Taxes
Let us assume that there are J* potential firms. The jth firm, if it invests K units of capi-
tal in the first period, will produce a stochastic real return in the second period of
R3 =f(K)O + h3(K1).4 Here, f and h are nonstochastic nonconvex functions, and O, is a
3. While many papers have been written previously on the effects of taxes on the amount of risk bearing, e.g. Domar
and Musgrave (1944), Mossin (1968), and Stiglitz (1969), almost all assume that individuals no longer bear what
risk is passed to the government. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, pp. 109.10) do point out, however, that a utility
compensated increase in the tax on risk taking has no effect on behavior.
4. As Leland (1974) points out, many alternative stochastic models are special cases of this formulation. For example,
the formulation can be consistent with either price or production uncertainty, and with either competitive or-6-
random variable with mean j.5Inthe second period, the firm pays back to its owners its initial
capital stock, now worth (l+a)K, plus the return R3.
The firm in the first period "goes public" and sells shares of ownership in this return to indi-
vidual investors. Denote the market value of these shares by V, where V implicitly depends
on the amount of capital K that the firm promises to acquire. The initial owners of the firm
when it goes public then divide the residual V3 —K3among themselves.
Before going public, the firm must decide how much capital K it will promise to acquire.
We assume that in doing so the firm maximizes the value of the residual V —Kgoing to its
initial owners. (We show below that each of the initial owners will find this policy to be utility
maximizing.) If V1 < K3 for all positive values of K3, then the potential firm would never
come into existence. Assume that tte first J firms choose to go public and acquire positive
amounts of capital.
ÔV
For these J firms, K3 will be chosen such that —i-- =1at this K3. This implies that in
.9Kg
equilibrium investors are willing to accept a stochastic real return in the second period of
Pj =f,'(K)O1 + h3(K1), with expectation Pjona dollar invested in the first period.
Let there be I individuals. Individual i has a utility function U1(C11,C,2) which depends on
consumption in each of the two periods. For convenience, both C,' and C12 are expressed in
nominal dollars, in spite of the presence of inflation.
Individual i's initial wealth is W, plus an initial percent ownership .ineach of the J firms
which decide to go public. He can lend to (or borrow from) other individuals at a nonstochas-
tic nominal interest rate r,withthe amount lent being denoted by D. He can also buy a per-
cent s,ofthe shares issued by each of the J firms when they go public. In doing so, he is sub-





5. The joint distribution of theis unrestricted.-7.
Individual I chooses values for C,
.D,,ands,,,subjectto his budget constraint, so as to
maximize his expected utility E U(C,',C,2),where
/
C,2= (l+r)L),-4-s,((l+)K+R1) (4) i—I




au, au1 where U11 = andU,2 —.Giventhe definition for R-,wecan infer from equation OC1 0C12
(Sb)that
—
E[(O.—O.)u12] +h(r—)K+ (l+r)(V—K) —f—-— forallj. (6)
The last term on the rightrepresents the risk premium. It must have the same valuefor all
individuals,since the equation holds for all 1, and it willincrease the right hand side given that
individuals are risk averse.
These equations must be satisfied for eachindividual. There is also an overall marketclear-
ing condition in the debt market whichrequires that
I
D1=0. (7) i—I
We know in addition that a dollarmarginal investment in any of the J firms is valuedat a
dollar by the market. Since the "marginalinvestment" is itself not a separate freely tradedsecu-
rity, in general any individual might value theresulting returns differently from a dollar. In
this model, however, the returnpattern of a marginal investment is identical to thatfrom a
suitably chosen portfolio of freely traded securities. Inparticular, the nominal return from a
dollar's marginal investment in the jth firm willhave exactly the same distributionas the corn-
j'v. bined returns from an amount —--investedin shares of the jth firm andan amount 1-8-
f1(i+r)
[fJ(1+w+k,')
—f;(hJ+(1+T)KJ)]lent to other individuals. (That is, the return pat-
tern of the marginal investment is within the span of the return patterns from these two other
available assets.) Therefore, all individuals can implicitly trade in a composite security with a
return pattern equal to that from a marginal investment in the jth firm so all must assign the
same value, one dollar, to this composite security. This implies that
f






If an individual is willing to pay just one dollar for the returns from the marginal investment
in the jth firm, it follows that
E[((l+r)+fjO+hj—(l+r))U1210 forall J. (10)
This implies that
E [(0 —0 .) U12)] f0+hj=r—i—f . (11) '-''-'12
Notethat this equation is very similar to equation (1) derived above characterizing the equili-
brium without taxes in the mean-variance context. The set of equations (3), (4), (5a), (6),
(7), (9), and (11) jointly determine the equilibrium values for D, C, C12, st,, r, V, and K
for all i and].
B. Equilibrium with Taxes
Now let us calculate the implications of imposing a corporate and a personal income tax, as
well as a property tax, with the tax revenue redistributed back to individuals in the second
period in a lump sum fashion. The lump sum transfers will be designed to eliminate any
income effects from the tax, so that we can focus on the effects of the price distortions.
Let us assume that the personal income tax is uniform across individuals and is imposed at a-9-
flatrate m on income from bonds and at a flat rate e on income from stocks. As before,
assume that purely inflationary capital gains are taxed at a lower rate c. We assume there is full
loss offset.
In addition, assume that the effects of the corporate and property taxes together are to tax
income from capital at a rate r and to tax the replacement cost of the capital stock at a rate t.
As before, we assume that the tax payments t K are deductible from corporate income before
r is imposed. To a degree, randt represent the corporate tax and the property tax respec-
tively. However, the marginal corporate tax rate often differs substantially from theaverage
corporate tax rate. We interpret r to equal the marginal corporate tax rate, while t is assumed
set so as to produce the correct average tax rate from both corporate and property taxes
together.6
With these taxes, when IC is invested in the jth type of capital, it produces an after cor-
porate and property tax income of R where
R7 =(1—r) (JO+ h3—
(K3)
. (12)
The new market value of this capital will be denoted by V'. As before, we assume that firms
invest in this capital until the market value of the after tax return to a dollar additional invest-
ment just equals one. Also as before, the residual amount J17—K is divided among the initial
owners of the firm.
When an individual now invests in bonds and stocks, his second period income will equal
C12(1+(l_m)r*)D1+sij[(l+(l—c)w)Kj + (1_e)R7J + 7', (13)
where r* denotes the new equilibrium interest rate, and where T, is the lump sum transfer
6. For example, let us introduce an investment tax credit at rate k. Also, let the true depreciation rate be d while
the allowed tax depreciation rate is d1. Gross returns to capital, when K, is invested, will now equal f1O •+
h+dK3.The return to capital after true depreciation, property taxes, and corporate income taxes, would now
(f1O3+h+dK) —dKj—tKj—-r(fjOj+hj+dKj—dKj—:Kj)+ kK1
r(d—4)—k (1—r)Ef8+h — ) K,]
Comparing this to equation (12) in the text, we see that thismo ccji lated set of tax provisions is equivalent to
a corporate income tax at rate r and a property tax at rate I+(1)- 10-




Solving again for the first-order conditions characterizing the individual's optimal choices, we
find
EU11=(l+(1_m)r*)EU12 (15a)
E[((1+(1_c)T)Kj+(1_e)Rj—(1+(l—m)r7)VJUj2} =0for all J. (15b)
Substituting for R7 as before, we obtain
+ h3 =tK+(1 a+(1(1') (VJ*_Kf) (16)
E[(0f—0j)U,2]
—fi for allj
A dollar marginal investment in any of the / firms must still be valued at a dollar both by
the market and by each individual. This is true since the distribution of the after tax return
from a marginal investment is identical to the distribution of the combined after tax returns




lent to other individuals. This implies that the market value of the latter portfolio must equal
fv' one dollar, so that' + A =1.Substituting for A, it follows that
Jj




Sinceeach individual is willing to pay just one dollar for the returns from the marginal
investment in the jth firm, it follows that
)(1—r) 0+h1'—t)—(1+(1—m )r* ))U12] =0. (18)
This implies that— 11—
=f;o,+h;= +(1-T..E[(O,—8)U]. (19)
The equilibrium with these taxes and transfers can be characterized by the joint solution of
equations (13), (14), (15a), (16), (17), and (19), along with equation (7). Taxes enter these
equations in many ways, so clearly this equilibrium will differ in general, and in complicated
ways, from the equilibrium without any taxes. However, as shown above in a mean-variance
setting, there are conditions under which the equilibrium allocation remains precisely
unchanged in spite of the various taxes. In particular, we can prove the following theorem:
Theorem: Imposing property taxes as well as corporate and personal income taxes on corporate
income, with the revenue returned in a lump sum fashion to individuals, will not affect the
equilibrium values for the C1' and K, or the distribution of values for the C2, as long as the
following conditions are satisfied:
a)(l—e)(l—r)t + (r—T)(r+e(l—r)) + ci-0
Jr 1
b)T,=(r+e(1—r))[(Vj—Kj)(.j_s1j) + s,j(R—(r—r)K) J,evaluatedat the values for
j.—1
andKinthe no tax equilibrium.
ProofInorder to prove this theorem, we will show that at the equilibrium prices
r,and (20a) 1-ni
=+(l—e)(1—r)(V—K) , (20b)
theset of equations (7), (13), (14), (15a),(16), (17), and(19), together characterizing the
equilibrium with taxes, are allsatisfiedatthe values for C,'and K,andthe distribution of
values for C12, implied by the no tax equilibrium, whenever conditions (a) and (b) from the
theorem are both satisfied. In addition, we will show that the same number of firms J will
choose to go public with and without taxes. These results are sufficient to prove the theorem.
In doing so, we find that the equilibrium values for the s,1 remain unchanged, but the equili-
brium values for D. do change.- 12-
Asa first step, it is straightforward to verify that if the values for C,', s,andK remain
unchanged, then the distribution of C,2 implied by equations (13) and (14) with taxes is identi-
cal to that implied by equations (3) and (4) without taxes, given conditions (a) and (b) and
equations (20a) and (20b). Condition (b) is designed so as to ensure this result. (The tedious
algebra is left to the reader.) This result implies that the equilibrium C,' and C'2 when there are
no taxes remain just feasible for each individual when there are taxes. Since V and V are not
equal, we see comparing equations (14) and (13) that the values for D, cannot be the same,
however.
If C,' and C,2 remain unchanged, then it follows that EU,,, EU,2, and E[(O—O)U,2] all
remain unchanged. Given this result and equation (20a), it follows immediately that equation
(15a) will be satisfied whenever equation (5a) is satisfied. In addition, given condition (a),
equation (19) will also be satisfied whenever equation (11) is satisfied.
In the case of equation (16), condition (a) and equation (20a) imply that
+(1_m)r*_(1_c)lrK1 =(r—ir)K.Equations(20a)and(20b)implythat
(I —e )(1—r)
(1+(l_m)r*)(V—Ky) =(l+r)(V—K).Together these results imply that equation (16) is
(l—e)(l—r)
satisfied whenever equation (6) is satisfied.
Comparing equation (17) with equation (9), we see that when condition (a) holds, the
right-hand side of the two equations are equal as long as K remains unchanged. But equations
(20a) and (20b) imply that the left-hand sides must be equal. Therefore, equation (17)will
also be satisfied at the no tax allocation and at the proposed prices.
The last equation to be checked is equation (7). As noted, the values of D, will differ
between the two allocations. However, if we solve for D, using equation (14) and then add





since= s—l.The same expression is implied by equation (3), implying that equation
i—I f—I- 13
(7) is satisfied at the proposed allocation in the equilibrium with taxes, since it is satisfied in the
equilibrium without taxes. Therefore, all the first order conditions characterizing the equili-
brium with taxes are satisfied at the no tax equilibrium values for C11, C,2,s,3, and K3, and at
the proposed prices in equations (20a) and (20b).
We next show that the government budget is balanced. Governmentrevenues, collected
from property taxes, corporate income taxes, and personal taxes, equal
J J I /
m Djr*+(crKj+e(1r)(R1rK1)) . (21) j1 f—I 1=1 jI
Using equations (7) and (20a), this simplifies to
I
(r+e(1—r)) (R—(r—ir)K) . (22)
i—i
Total transfers, however, equal
I I =(r+e(l—r))(R—(r—ir)K) jI
I I
since SIf =1.Since revenues equal transfers, the budget is balanced.
i—Ij1
As a final step, we show that the same number of firms choose togo public. A firm will go
public with no taxes if and only if V—K ￿ 0. But equation (20b) implies thatV—Kg is pro-
portional to V1—K1, so when one is non-negative the other is non-negative. Therefore the
same set of J firms will choose to go public with and without taxes. Q.E.D.
Before proceeding, let us return briefly to confirm that the firm, when it choosesK so as to
maximize V—Ky, is in fact acting in the interests of its shareholders. If initial owner iwere to
choose the value of K best for him, he would choose that value maximizing hisutility, taking
into account the effects on V but taking other prices as given. The resulting first-order condi-
tion would be:
E {[(1+(1_m ))(('—1)—sgf)+sJ((1+(1—c)T)+(l—e )R')]U12} =0.(23)- 14-
Denotethe value of V' at his preferred choice for K by v. If the returns from the marginal
investment are valued at v in the market, however, then individual i will also value these
returns at v1 (since the pattern of returns is within the span of those available from marketed
securities). This implies that
E{[((l+(1_c)r) + (1—e)R) —
(1+(1_m))vi]Ui2}
0. (24)
Given equation (24), however, equation (23) simplifies to
E[(1+(l_m)r*).j(V_1)Ui2] =
Weconclude that the IC for which v7= 1is the optimal choice for any individual i. There-
fore, all shareholders will want the firm to choose K so as to maximize V'—K1, the assumed
policy. If all tax rates were set to zero, this result continues to hold.
Let us now explore the implications of the above theorem. Since tax revenues were
returned in a lump sum fashion, the theorem gives assumptions under which taxation of capital
income causes no efficiency loss whatever. Condition (b), while necessary to prevent any
change in the equilibrium allocation, however, is not necessary to prevent any efficiency costs
from the taxes. The equilibrium will certainly remain efficient with any alternative set of non-
stochastic lump sum transfers. Redistributing the lotteries O, among individuals will also have
no efficiency effect, as shown in Diamond (1967). Individuals trade freely in these lotteries,
and will arrive at an efficient allocation of them regardless of government transfers.
The key assumption, therefore, implying that these taxes are nondistorting, is condition (a).
This condition requires that no net tax revenues be collected from any risk free investment,
which would earn a nominal rate of return in this case of r=(l—m )r*. The parameter values
used in the argument in section I just satisfy this condition. As in section I, however, the aver-
age tax rate can still be quite high. Equation (22) provides an expressionfor total tax revenues.
I




Theratio is the average before tax real rate of return to capital. Feldstein and f—I j1
Summers (1977) estimate that for U.S. nonfinancial corporations, this rate ofreturn has aver-
aged .106 for the period 1948-1976. Using this estimate along with theparameter value




the expected average tax rate would in fact exceed .662.




Substituting from equation (16) for ER, and simplifying using condition (a) and equations




Therefore tax revenues in effect come from a tax on pure profits plus a taxon the risk prem-
ium. The pure profits tax is clearly nondistorting. The tax on the riskpremium leaves incen-
tives unaffected, as in section I, because the government provides justoffsetting benefits to
investors by absorbing the same fraction (r+e(1—r)) of the risk in the return from the invest-
ment.
We therefore conclude that taxes on capital income are distorting in this modelonly to the
degree that the total taxes paid from the returns to a risk free investment are nonzero. If
these taxes are negative, then the tax law provides a net stimulus to savings andinvestment,
7. Note that the last term in equation (25) has the same value for all i, since equation (16) holdssimultaneously for all i.
J
f—I- 16-
eventhough the average tax rate can still remain very high. If the parametervalue assump-
tions made above are close to correct, then the net distortion is at least verysmall.8
The net distortion also depends in unexpected ways on some of the tax rates. For example,
if the tax rate e on equity income were larger than .16, then there would be a net subsidy to
savings and investment. Similarly, if the marginal corporate income tax rateis higher than .5,
then there is also a net subsidy. These counterintuitive results arise because taxableincome
(r—r—t)ona risk free investment is negative,9 given the other assumed parametervalues. In
either case, however, total tax revenue should go up, as seen in equation (21).
III. Exploration of Underlying Assumptions
The model in section II, while in some ways very general, still contains manyrestrictive
assumptions. In this section, we will briefly explore how the results areaffected if several of
these assumptions are relaxed. We will find, as we relax assumptions, that the taxationof capi-
tal income can well result in an efficiency gain.
A. Introduction of Noncorporate Investment
In the above model, all capital was assumed to be in the corporate sector. Let us nowintro-
duce a noncorporate sector with J,, active firms.'° When the amount of capital Kj'is invested by
the jth noncorporate firm, the real return in period two will be f(Kj)O7 + hj (K)').For sim-
plicity, let each firm be owned by one individual. Without lossof generality, let the owner of
firm jbeindividual j.
Letus first recharacterize the no tax equilibrium with theseadditional firms. The proprietor
of firm jhasto decide how much of his wealth to invest in the capital stock ofhis firm. The
first order condition characterizing his optimal choice is
E[(f)'O —hJ'+ (1+ir)—(l+r))Uj2] =0 (26)
8. Recall, however, that to the degree that the average corporate income tax rate is below the marginal rate,then the
appropriate estimate for I ought to be smaller, suggesting a net subsidy to savingsand investment.
9. Recall that r— (l_m)r*,where r*isthe nominal market interest rate, with taxes.
10. Firms are assumed to be corporate or noncorporate by fiat, and not by choice.- 17-
whichimplies that
E[(O—OM)U.2] ffO+hJ! rr—fj'r:rT (27) ''-'f2
Whileequation (26) is identical in form to equation (11), it holds only for individual j,andnot
for all individuals. Risk from noncorporate capital is borneentirely by the proprietor, while
proportional shares in the risk from corporate capital are distributed efficiently across individu-
als.
Let us now reexplore how the equilibrium conditions would be different whentaxes exist.
Assume that noncorporate firms face a property tax rate t,,,andthat proprietors have a personal
income tax rate n on real income from their firm, and a personal tax rateci,, on inflationary cap-
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(29)
For this tax structure to leave the equilibrium unaffected, it iseasy to show that the follow-
ing conditions, in addition to those in the previous theorem, must be satisfied:
al) t(l—n)+fl(r—T)+CI.=O
bi) The lump sum transfer to individual jmustbe larger by n Jj'Oj+ht—(r—ir)Jcj')
Three interesting conclusions follow from this. First, capital willnormally be misallocated
between the corporate and noncorporate sectors, since the first two termson the right hand
sides of equations (19) and (29), which measure the value of the marginalproduct in each sec-
tor net of risk bearing costs, will differ in general. However, the nature of theresulting misal-
location of capital will likely be counterintuitive. For example, assume thatt'=tandcc but
n <r+e(l—r), sothat proprietors face a lower net tax rate on real income. Then withour
previous parameter assumptions (which imply that r—(1—c)w= (l_m)r*—(l—c)r<0),the- 18-
taxlaw would induce capital to flow out of the noncorporate sector into the corporatesector.11
Second, if proprietors were given the option of incorporating, their choice would be surpris-
ingly complicated. Let us assume that the only tax difference is that n < 'r+e(1—r),and con-
sider whether the proprietor's utility goes up when n is increased. The derivative of his utility
with respect to n equals
—L'(ffl1t .1.. Lfl_ T.'fl\ 'j "'j) j2




(fj'OJ'+h) —(fJ1 0J1+hJ')KJ +
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We find that there are two offsetting aspects affecting the proprietor's decision. The difference
between the first two terms reflects the pure' profits earned by the firm. These profits would be
taxed at a higher rate were the firm to incorporate, thus discouraging incorporation. (Of
course, if the firm were in a competitive industry with free entry,then pure profits would be
zero.) Whether the increased tax rate on normal profits is a net cost or a net benefit depends on
whether the real before tax risk free return (the last term) is positive or negative. Any extra
taxes paid on the risk premium are entirely offset by the fact that the governmentalso absorbs
more of the risk. With the above parameter value assumptions, thebefore tax risk free return
is negative, so the higher tax rate is a net gain. Therefore, in general, the proprietor's optimal
choice would depend on the characteristics of his profit function as well as on the taxrates.12
Third, condition (bi) above prevents any redistribution of the risk in the return from non-
corporate capital. This risk, however, is not distributed efficiently initially.Therefore, the
government can create an efficiency gain by redesigning the lump sumtransfers so as to shift
the risk from a noncorporate firm away from the proprietor. The higher the tax rate n, the
more of the risk the government can reallocate, so the larger the potential efficiency gain.
11. This occurs because the first two terms on the right hand side of equation (29) exceed those in equation (19)with
taxes, but are equal without taxes.
12. This analysis ignores any gains to incorporation from public trading of equity, and the resulting sharing of risk by a
larger group of individuals.19 -
Ahigh tax rate n can cause condition (al) to be substantially violated,however, distorting
noncorporate investment decisions. This counterbalancing cost can be lessened (oreven elim-
inated), however, by suitable readjustment of the tax rate1,,. Recall that t,, incorporates effects
from the difference between the marginal and theaverage personal income tax rates, as well as
from property taxes. Therefore, if the net tax rateon the left hand side of condition (a I) is
positive, at any given n, investment tax credits or a more liberal taxdepreciation policy can be
introduced so as to lower in. This lessens the violation of condition(al) while maintaining n,
and so the potential for redistributing risk in a more efficient manner.13
B. Inefficient Distribution of Corporate Risk
We have assumed so far that corporate risk would be allocatedefficiently by the private
market, with or without taxes. Therefore, unlike in the situation withnoncorporate risks, the
government has no potential to improve on the allocation of corporate risk. However, thereis
some reason to presume that the private sector has not distributed this riskefficiently. Accord-
ing to the Statistics of Income for 1977, only 15.5% of tax returnsreported any dividend income
whatsoever, and only 10.6% reported dividend income exceeding theexempt amount of $200
for married couples and $100 for single individuals. Yet, in theabove model, the optimal value
offor an individual would almost always be nonzero.
Why then do such a large percent of the population not own stock? Much of theexplana-
tion probably lies in the standard forms of market imperfections."Trading itself is costly, and
the percentage cost is higher for small trades. In addition, theminimum trading size -one
share -maybe large relative to an individual's desired holding. (Index fundsnow lessen this
problem.) Individuals also face borrowing constraints, preventing them frombuying stock when
their current wealth, ignoring expected future earnings, is too small.Moral hazard problems
presumably inhibit lenders from providing funds to such people, since futureearnings cannot
be used as collateral. Market institutions undoubtedlydevelop so as to minimize the impor-
tance of these problems, but do so conditional on the true resource costs involvedin running a
13. One further problem, however, is that n is also the tax rate on the labor incometo the proprietor, inhibiting the use of a high n to redistribute risk.- 20-
market,and on the statutory regulations governing individual bankruptcies.
If the government, however, faced no such costs in reallocating risk, or at least lower costs
than the private sector, then it could potentially create an efficiency gain by shifting risk towards
those who face a trading constraint preventing them from reaching the optimal amount of risk
bearing.'4 As with taxation of noncorporate income, the incentive would be to set a high cor-
porate income tax rate, so that a large part of the risk goes to the government, to be reallocated
hopefully towards those who can bear it more cheaply. Any resulting distortions to investment
incentives can then be corrected by suitable changes in the nonstochastic components of the tax
structure, such as the investment tax credit or tax depreciation policies.'5
For this to be worthwhile, however, the government must face lower costs than the private
sector in reallocating risk. One situation where the government should clearly find it cheaper is
in the intergenerational reallocation of risk. In principle, efficiency would require that even
unborn generations share in the risk in the return on existing capital. Yet these individuals do
not trade currently in equity for the obvious reason that they are not yet alive. Also since they
are not alive yet, there is no alternative way to set up a mutually beneficial contract cx ante to
spread the risk across generations. If parents choose to leave bequests, or children choose to
aid their parents, however, then the transfer can be adjusted to reflect the outcomes of current
lotteries, without need of an cx ante contract. Otherwise, such sharing of risk is unlikely to
occur through the private market.
The government can easily reallocate wealth across generations in this context through its
debt management policy. When there is an unfavorable outcome, causing tax revenues to fall,
it can run a deficit, creating government debt. This new debt replaces real capital in individual
portfolios, implying a smaller capital stock available to following generations. By lowering their
wage rate, and so their utility, this shifts some of the risk onto them. (Diamond (1965)
develops this argument very generally in a nonstochastic setting.) Allowing the deficit to be sto-
14. If individuals face no constraint, however, then the government cannot create an efficiency gain by reallocating risk,
even if risk is distributed inefficiently, since individuals will trade so as to undo any reallocation by the government.
15. Current tax credit and depreciation policy, however, distorts the firm's choice concerning the durability of its
capital, as shown in Auerbach (1979) or Bradford (1980).- 21-
chasticis probably the main way in which the government does in fact handle stochastic reve-
nue from capital income.
Thus this argument provides a rationale for high corporate tax rates, perhaps generous
investment incentives, and a variable government deficit. It is intriguing that government pol-
icy has in fact evolved in this direction.
C. Variation in Corporate Tax Rates
So far, we have assumed that corporate and property tax rates are equal for all firms. What
if these tax rates vary by firm? Introducing a noncorporate sector was in effect a special case of
this.
Let us now assume. that firm jfacesa property tax rate t and a corporate income tax rate
Tj.Then,in equilibrium, equation (19) becomes




In general, the sum of the first two terms on the right hand side of equation (1 9a), which
measures the marginal product of capital net of risk bearing costs, will vary by firm. Therefore,
capital will indeed be misallocated across firms. However, if (l_m)r*<(l_c)lr, then capital
will move towards those firms facing higher values for Ti.
In the special case where (1_m)r*=(1_c)w, we find that any variation in r creates no
additional distortions, so no reallocation of capital.More generally, the difference
(1—rn )r*_(1__c)w would normally be very much smaller than the risk premium. As a result,
the implied percent distortion in the required marginal product of capital (the right hand side of
equation 19a) would be very small, even with wide variations in r. For example, withthe
parameter values from section I, the equilibrium p is .105. If, for any firm,the corporate tax
were to be entirely eliminated, the equilibrium p increases to .119, a change of only13.3%.
Similarly, if any firm were to face twice as large a property tax rate, its equilibrium pwould
increase to .118, a change of just 12.4%.16 We find that even very large changes in tax rates
16. Recall that p equals the value of the marginal product net of depreciation. The percent change in the value of the- 22-
shouldcause only modest changes inthe allocation of capital.
Therefore, while variation in i-willstill cause a misallocation of capital acrossindustries,
capital may well be shiftedtowards more highly taxed industries,and the degree of misalloca-
tion, and so the distortion costs,caused by the varying tax rates ought tobe very small. These
conclusions are in sharp contrast to thosefrom certainty models, as in Harberger(1962).
D. AvailabilitY of Debt Finance
So far, we have assumed that firms useonly equity finance. In allowingfor debt finance, let
us first assume that debt isriskless, and that all firms areconstrained to maintain a debt-capital
rate equal to y. We can also assume,without loss of generality, that all investorsbuy a propor-
tionate share in both the debt and the equityof the firm, since private lending is a perfectsub-
stitute for debt purchases.
The after personal tax return from adollar marginal investment now becomes
(1_m)yr* + (1_e)(l_r)(fj0j+hjti')+ (l+(1c)ir)
(l_e)(1_r41J0J+hr(t
+(1+(l—c)ir) (30)
Comparing this expression with theafter personal tax return to capitalin the previous model,
we conclude that introducingrisk free debt is equivalent to loweringthe effective property tax
rate, on the assumption that m< r+e(1—r). This reduction inthe effective t would cause
there to be more savings and investment,
and perhaps more than would haveoccurred without
any taxes.
Allowing the firm to choose itsdebt-capital ratio, with debt becomingrisky as a result,
makes the model very much more complicated,as described in Auerbach-Kiflg(1979). In a
mean-variance setting, however, the analysisremains straightforward. When riskis measured
solely by the covariance of the returnwith that on the market portfolio, dividingthe risk arbi-
trarily between debt and equitydoes not affect the total risk premiumdemanded by the market.
Therefore, without taxes, the firmfinds all debt-capital ratios equallyattractive -the
I prothOSS of depron, the vue of the physi V P- 23-
Modigliani-Miller(1958) conclusion. With taxes, we see from equation (30) that an increase in
the debt-capital ratio y causes an increase in the after tax rate of return received from a given
capital stock. Therefore, considering tax effects alone, the firm would prefer to set the fraction
y equal to one.
If there is to be an internal optimum for the debt-capital ratio, extra costs must arise as the
debt-capital ratio increases. At an internal equilibrium, these extra costs at the margin would
just offset the tax advantage favoring debt finance. These extra costs are presumably real costs,
and represent efficiency costs from the tax distortion favoring debt finance.
Introducing the possibility of debt still lowers the cost of capital to the firm, however. The
debt-capital ratio would be chosen so as to minimize the cost of capital. At equilibrium, the tax
advantages of further debt would just b outweighed by real leverage costs from further debt)7
However, the real leverage costs are true costs created by extra investment, which ought to be
taken into account for efficient investment incentives, while the tax inventive to use debt
artificially lowers the cost of capital to the firm from that calculated assuming solely equity
finance. Therefore, the initial analysis above, where the firm used a fixed debt-capital ratio y,
provides a full description for how taxes distort investment incentives. The only needed
change to the formula when debt is risky is to add a leverage cost term comparable to the risk
premium term, each measuring real costs created by the investment.
IV. Conclusions
By treating uncertainty and inflation explicitly in modelling the effects of taxes on capital
income, we have produced conclusions sharply at variance with those in earlier papers, where
uncertainty and inflation are ignored. The principle contrasting conclusions are:
1) Many previous papers suggest that taxes on corporate income cause the amount of cor-
porate capital to fall to an inefficiently low level. We find that the amount of corporate capital
is largely unaffected by these taxes, and may well have increased.
17. DeAngelo-Masulis (1980) and Miller (1977) arguethatas more debt is used, the tax advantage to debt erodes.
The argument in the text ignores, but is not incompatible with this possibility.- 24-
2)Many previous papers suggest that taxes induce the noncorporate sector to expand rela-
tive to the corporate sector. We find that the opposite is likely, though only to avery small
degree.
3) Many previous papers suggest that there are important efficiency costs created by the
current level of taxation of capital income. This model suggests that at worst these distortion
costs ought to be very small, and that there could well be an efficiency gain resulting from the
taxes.
4) The tax policy change recommended in some previous papers has normally been to
reduce sharply the tax rates on capital income, perhaps through a shift to a consumption tax.
The tax changes suggested by the analysis in this paper would be to maintain high marginal tax
rates on capital income, but then maintain adequate investment incentives though a suitable
selection of such instruments as tax depreciation policy and the investment tax credit. Also,
the government probably ought to react to the resulting variations in tax revenues by allowing
the deficit to fluctuate. This paper therefore seems to provide justification for someaspects of
current tax and debt management policies.
It should be pointed out, however, that the analysis in this paper ignores certain distortions
created by the taxation of capital income. No attempt was made to estimate the efficiency costs
created by the tax distortion favoring debt over equity finance, the tax distortion affecting the
firm's choice for the durability of its capital, or the tax distortion affecting whether or not the
firm chooses to incorporate. Also, the analysis ignored the variation in individual marginal tax
rates. The resulting variation in individual marginal time preference rates reflects an
inefficiency in the allocation of savings across individuals. What we did conclude is that with
the current tax treatment of capital income, both the total amount of savings and the allocation
of the resulting capital across firms should be close to efficient. Also, the reallocation of risk by
the government may create an efficiency gain.- 25-
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